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Market Report
Yr 
Ago
4 Wks
Ago 1/6/12
Livestock and Products,
 Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
  35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
  Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb.. . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
  Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . . . .
Choice Boxed Beef, 
  600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
  Carcass, Negotiated. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass,   
  51-52% Lean.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, Ch. & Pr., Heavy,
  Wooled, South Dakota, Direct. . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout,
  FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
$105.29
147.34
126.83
165.81
70.45
78.35
161.00
352.13
$120.46
169.51
148.50
188.57
82.68
89.48
158.00
403.36
$121.23
180.07
151.11
192.34
82.29
84.77
152.50
396.54
Crops, 
 Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
  Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
  Omaha, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
  Omaha, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grain Sorghum, No. 2, Yellow
  Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
  Minneapolis, MN , bu. . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.87
5.68
13.21
9.46
3.89
5.93
5.99
11.00
10.04
3.24
6.07
       *
       *
10.88
3.10
Feed
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
  Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
  Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
  Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good
  Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture, 
  Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture, 
  Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
140.00
72.50
     *
186.00
65.00
155.00
132.50
95.00
216.00
70.00
155.00
140.00
97.50
214.50
73.50
*No Market
Elinor Ostrom, a professor at Indiana University, was
awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences (first
woman to ever receive it) in 2009, sharing it with  Professor 
Oliver Williamson. The prize was awarded “for her analysis
of economic governance, especially the commons.” She
“challenged the conventional wisdom by demonstrating
how local property can be successfully managed by local
commons without any regulation by central authorities or
privatization” (http://www.nobelprize.org/). Also, full
privatization, i.e., assigning individual property rights
rather than shared, common property rights, is also not
essential. She summarizes her contribution in the finding
“that humans have a more complex motivational structure
and more capability to solve social dilemmas than posited
in rational-choice theory,” thus going beyond both
traditional economic and government oriented frameworks
for analyzing the common pool resource problem. 
So what is the social dilemma? Over-use and the
general abuse of common-pool resources (such as forests,
water systems, fisheries, global atmospheres) are examples
of social dilemmas. That is, when driven by self-interest 
only, with little to no consideration given to the shared
interests with other participants or the environment, there
is a tendency to over-use common pool resources. As a
result, according to this model of self-interest only
behavior, it is not possible to sustain long-term use of such
resources. In other words, there is a conflict between
personal interest (i.e., self-interest) and shared interests
(other-interest). However, as Ostrom showed, there are
many cases where resource users actually had overcome
social dilemmas (they managed to solve their own problems
of resource overuse, together) to sustain long-term use of
common pool resources. Her results thus challenge the
presumption that individuals could not overcome social
dilemmas, and thus the presumption that strong government
involvement, or complete individual privatization of the
resource, was essential. Rather, her findings point to the
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jointness and nonseparability of individual and combined
efforts with others, the latter perhaps arising through
government, but not necessarily so. 
After developing theoretical models of common-pool
resource situations, Ostrom and her colleagues decided to
examine the effect of combinations of different variables
on human behavior, in both laboratory and field settings.
Both lab and field experiments suggest that many
predictions of the conventional theory of collective action
do not hold,  i.e., more cooperation takes place than
predicted and subjects invest in sanctioning free-riders,
and there is motivational heterogeneity in harvesting,
contribution and sanctioning decisions. Specifically, when
subjects do not know the reputation of others and cannot
communicate, then individuals over-harvest. On the other
hand, when subjects communicate and otherwise interact,
they often agree on joint strategies, are able to create
effective governance of the resource, as well as increase
their earnings and reduce the level of over-harvesting. In
effect, they learn to temper their self-interest only
tendencies. From field work, involving a large number of
studies of irrigation systems in Nepal as well as of forests
all over the world, she also challenges the presumption
that governments always do better in organizing and
protecting important resources than users themselves.
Others, using her research methods, have also  reported
effective, individually designed systems in Japan, India
and Sri Lanka as well.
So given all of her work, what we know now is that
“earlier theories of rational individuals who are trapped in
social dilemmas are not supported by a large number of
studies using diverse methods” (Ostrom, 2009, p. 429).
However, this does not mean that dilemmas will always be
solved by those involved;  as suggested by Ostrom: 
· We need to recognize that not only individual
differences affect individual behavior but also the
context in which interactions take place strongly
affects individual choices.
· In some contexts, one can move beyond the
presumption that rational individuals are not able
to overcome social dilemma situations.
· When individuals face a social dilemma in a
microsetting, “they are more likely to cooperate
when situational variables increase the likelihood
of gaining trust that others will reciprocate,” i.e.,
recognizing the important role of trust in
overcoming social dilemmas.
· It is essential to understand both social and
ecological factors that affect human behavior.
Ostrom concludes her Nobel Prize lecture with: 
“The most important lesson for public policy
analysis derived from the intellectual journey I
have outlined here is that humans have a more
complex motivational structure and more
capability to solve social dilemmas than posited
in earlier rational-choice theory. Designing
institutions to force (or nudge) entirely self-
interested individuals to achieve better outcomes
has been the major goal posited by policy
analysts for governments to accomplish for much
of the past half century. Extensive empirical
research leads me to argue that instead, a core
goal of public policy should be to facilitate the
development of institutions that bring out the
best in humans. We need to ask how diverse
polycentric institutions help or hinder the
i nnova t iveness ,  l ea rn ing,  adapt ing ,
trustworthiness, levels of cooperation of
participants, and the achievement of more
effective, equitable, and sustainable outcomes at
multiple scales ( p. 435).” 
As Thaler and Sustein (2008) show (see http://agecon-
cpanel.unl.edu/lynne/metaeconomics/), individuals not only
respond to incentives, but also often need to be nudged
toward better, shared decisions. This is in the same line of
reasoning, both based in solid empirical science, with what
Ostrom proposes. We need to temper our tendencies to self-
interest only. This is done through internalizing the
interests we share with others in sustaining the common
pool resources like aquifers, and the very atmosphere of
this spaceship Earth on which we travel, together. 
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